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The American Health Lawyers Association has created a new Public Interest blog to relay important breaking news about the Supreme Court’s hearings and opinion on the challenge to the Affordable Care Act. As an exciting added feature of this blog, AHLA will offer first-hand coverage of the oral arguments on the individual mandate scheduled for March 27, 2012. Professor
Mark Hall will be attending the hearings that day and will act as a guest blogger for AHLA immediately following those arguments. We also expect to be able to provide same-day coverage of the hearings on March 26 and 28, 2012.

AHLA members may act as bloggers and comment on current posts. This blog is open to AHLA members for comment. Non-members may access the blog on a read-only basis. In responding to a post, AHLA requests that its members focus on the legal arguments involved, and refrain from using the blog for political purposes or to advocate for any particular candidate or position. Any opinions, statements or positions appearing on this blog are those of their respective author(s) and not necessarily those of AHLA or its membership as a whole. Please contact us if you have questions or concerns.

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Panelists Argue Whether PPACA Is Necessary And Proper Execution of Commerce Clause

Listen to the audio of this session.

Reproduced with permission from Daily Report for Executives, 99 DER K-4 (May 23, 2012).          Copyright 2012 by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (800-372-1033)

 

By John T. Aquino

A university professor told a health lawyers conference May 22 that the health care reform law is constitutional under the necessary and proper clause and that the solicitor general during Supreme Court oral arguments let the opposition use smokescreens about broccoli.

A lawyer who has often argued before the Supreme Court countered that the necessary and proper clause can only be used to implement an enumerated power and that requiring the uninsured to enter the market to improve commerce is not a necessary and proper implementation of the commerce clause.

Their disagreement appeared to center on whether the necessary and proper clause can only be used to remove barriers to commerce or whether it can be used to find solutions to a problem.

The session at the American Health Lawyers Association's conference “The Intersecting Worlds of Drug, Device, Biologics, and Health Law” in Washington was titled “The Supreme Court Argument and Its Impact on the Future of the Affordable Care Act.” Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), every American--with certain statutory exceptions--must carry a minimum level of health insurance or pay a penalty.

Oral arguments on the constitutionality of the PPACA were held in NFIB v. Sebelius, U.S., No. 11-393 and Florida v. HHS, U.S., No. 11-400 on March 26, 27, and 28.

'We've Allowed Smokescreens to Take Over.'

In the AHLA session, Martin H. Redish, professor of law and policy at Northwestern University School of Law, said PPACA is constitutional and that it is “an easy commerce clause analysis.”

Section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution states, “[The Congress shall have power] to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” During his oral arguments before the court, Redish said, the solicitor general did not focus on this clause and he should have.

“It is uncontested that Congress regulates the insurance industry under the commerce clause since it involves interstate commerce. The PPACA's mandate that the uninsured buy health insurance may or may not be an exercise in commerce, but, with 60 million Americans who have no health insurance, it is a plausible 'necessary and proper' exercise of Congress's power within its larger authority to regulate the insurance industry,” Redish said.

For precedent of the use of the “necessary and proper clause” to carry out Congress's execution of the commerce clause, Redish cited Justice John Marshall's 1819 ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland, which held that Congress had implied powers under the necessary and proper clause to create the Second Bank of the United States and gave Congress broad discretionary power to implement the enumerated powers. He also noted the Supreme Court's 2010 ruling in United States v. Comstock,U.S., No. 08-1224, 5/17/10, quotes McCulloch for the position that the necessary and proper clause demonstrates that the Constitution's grants of specific federal legislative authority to Congress are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are “convenient or useful” or “conducive” to the “beneficial exercise” of Congress's authority.


The debate highlighted how far Congress can go in matters involving commerce.


“It's not a close call,” Redish said, “unless you allow, as the solicitor general did during oral arguments, the opponents of the law to change the subject, which had the court discussing whether or not Congress can make us buy broccoli. The opponents ask, 'Can you force someone into commerce?' And the answer is, that's not the right question. The right question is, does the necessary and proper clause allow the government to execute the commerce clause? And the answer is yes. They say that individuals who are not in the market are being forced into the market. But where does it say that Congress can only regulate active rather than passive behavior. We've allowed smokescreens to take over.”

Redish concluded, “Where Congress has the clear power to regulate commerce, and the regulation of insurance is clearly within that power, it can do other things that make it feasible.”

'Congress Cannot Regulate Teetotalers.'

Michael A. Carvin of Jones Day, Washington, agreed with Redish that the focus in the case should be on the necessary and proper clause. “But where he's off the rails is that this clause can only be used to implement an enumerated power. Under this clause, Congress can eliminate impediments to the regulation of commerce, but that's not what the PPACA does,” Carvin said.

“He [Redish] is saying Congress can regulate people who are not in the health insurance market to become part of this market,” Carvin continued. “While it's clear that Congress can regulate people who make bathtub gin because their actions affect the liquor market, it cannot regulate teetotalers.”

If it is within Congress's powers to bring healthy people into the insurance market by requiring that they buy services they do not need in order to bring down costs, then Congress has the power to require that everyone buy a car because it benefits commerce, Carvin said. “Then it is no longer about eliminating barriers. Then there is no limit on what Congress can regulate, and it basically gives Congress plenary police powers.”

No Precedent.

Redish said in response, “The necessary and proper clause is not just about trying to stop interference or barriers but it is also about finding solutions.” He challenged Carvin to cite a Supreme Court case that said that the clause was only about stopping interference with commerce.

Carvin answered, “There's a reason why in 200 years the court has never had to rule on this and that's because members of Congress read the Constitution and realized there was a difference between regulating people in a market and forcing people to enter a market. Congress has never forced someone to do something before by citing the commerce clause because it is not commerce.”

When Redish argued that the government requires those who are employed to enter the Social Security system, Carvin said that that was under Congress's taxing powers and not under either the commerce clause or the necessary and proper clause. “If Congress wants to do it as a tax, Congress can do it as a tax. But it didn't set it up that way, and President Obama said that it is not a tax.”

When Redish asked him again for precedent for his position, Carvin repeated that he could not cite a case because Congress has never done such a thing before. “It's not unconstitutional to do something for the first time,” Redish said.

The court is expected to issue its decision by the end of June.

By John T. Aquino


Copyright 2012, The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.

Why the Supreme Court Can't Afford to Find the Health Law Unconstitutional
Member Miles Zaremski published his latest views on the health reform constitutional case in the Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/miles-j-zaremski/why-the-supreme-court-can_b_1387114.html
The Lasting Implications of the Healthcare Case of the Century …

Gerald M. Griffith, Jones Day

AHLA President, FY 2012

 

We have all heard the hype around sporting events—such and such game is the “game of the century” or a heavyweight boxing match is the “fight of the century.” In the august chamber of the Supreme Court in March 2012 we were witness—either in person for a lucky few or vicariously for the rest of us—to the Healthcare Case of the Century (or actually three consolidated cases). Via blogs, links to the audio and transcripts, summaries and webinars, AHLA has been on top of developments in the case as only AHLA can be. The AHLA staff and volunteers involved all deserve our thanks for keeping us apprised of these important developments—and there is surely more to come regardless of the outcome in the case.

 

To predict the outcome of the pending Supreme Court decision on the healthcare reform law would be foolhardy at best. Even predictions as to the final vote count on each of the argued issues vary widely. What may be easier to predict in broad strokes is the effect that each possible combination of answers will have on the healthcare sector. This month, I would like to run through what those effects might be under a variety of potential outcomes—without commenting on the likelihood of any of those outcomes. In general terms though, I think it is safe to say that whatever the outcome, the aftermath will alter the healthcare sector for years to come.

 

Day One—The Anti-Injunction Act

The Anti-Injunction Act in principle sounds simple enough—the rule is pay the tax first and litigate it later. We all learned in Constitutional Law that in many instances, appellate courts look for jurisdictional bases to avoid deciding the merits. The question here, however, is whether the penalty imposed by the healthcare reform law for failure to buy minimum coverage is itself a tax or whether it is subject to the same limitations on pursuing litigation before payment—and whether the act is in fact jurisdictional or whether it is a claim processing rule. The penalty is included in the Internal Revenue Code, and the law says the penalty is to be “assessed and collected in the same manner” as other penalties assessed under Section 5000A(g)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. What complicates this question is that both parties now agreed that the Act does not apply, and there is precedent for the federal government waiving the provisions of the Act, albeit dated. Counsel to the federal government argued that the Act did not apply, and the penalty was not a tax, and distinguished its argument on the individual mandate by arguing that Congress can exercise its broad taxing power for more than levying taxes. As a result, the Court appointed counsel to amicus curiae to argue that the Act does apply.

 

If the Court finds that the Act applies in this case, then the earliest time at which a challenge could be mounted again in the courts would be when the affected individuals file tax returns in 2015. In the meantime, the healthcare sector and regulators likely would proceed full steam ahead in implementing the healthcare reform law. States that have resisted these changes may continue to do so at least until after the Presidential election when it should become clear whether there are enough votes for a legislative change to the law. Any such delay, however, would put the states at risk of falling far behind in implementation, potentially with negative financial and operational effects on providers operating within their borders.

 

On the other hand, if the Court rules that the Act does not apply—for example, because the penalty is not a tax or because the federal government has waived the protection of the Act—then some of the uncertainty around the law would be resolved now rather than in November or in 2015. How that affects the healthcare sector in turn depends on how each of the remaining issues is resolved.

 

Day Two—The Individual Mandate

Whether the individual mandate is upheld or struck down depends on the Court’s interpretation of two fundamental powers of Congress—the power to regulate commerce and the taxing power. In part, and in a wrinkle our Antitrust attorney colleagues may find interesting, it may come down to a definition of the relevant market. Is it healthcare, a subset of healthcare services or insurance? If Congress can regulate the transaction (in whichever the relevant market is) at the point of sale, is the mandate just a matter of timing? In other words, is it, as some of the Justices suggested, the only practical way to regulate the transaction because insurers would not sell coverage to someone when they show up in the emergency room seeking treatment? Is Congress, putting aside the public policy arguments in support of its decision, forcing people to enter into commerce or are they already in commerce or affecting commerce on the theory that everyone likely will need some healthcare services at some point in time? Can the penalty under Section 5000A(g)(1) of the Code be a proper exercise of the taxing power even if it is not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, or is it an impermissible direct tax? Does the failure to expressly rely on the taxing power mean that it is irrelevant now even if Congress could have relied on that power? All of these questions and more were bandied about in some fast-paced exchanges on the second day of oral argument.

 

If the individual mandate is upheld, barring an election sweep for the Republicans, the effects on the healthcare sector seem relatively clear. The law will be implemented in most if not all key respects to the point that it becomes as entrenched in the healthcare sector as Medicare and Medicaid. Whether it achieves the promise proponents believe it has to improve quality and access to care and control costs of healthcare coverage, however, only time will tell. If the mandate is upheld, however, it likely will have time on its side or at least enough time to assess whether the reforms overall are beneficial to the healthcare sector and the public.

 

On the other hand, if the mandate is found to be unconstitutional, there will be significant pressure on both major political parties to put forth an alternative plan—either to pay for the remaining provisions of the law or to replace the law with other reforms to address the same policy concerns of lack of insurance for many Americans and the escalating costs of healthcare. Although this may take the form of a legislative compromise, it also may become instead a central issue again in the Presidential election this year. For the healthcare sector, this could mean retooling many of the processes already developed or in progress to address the elements of the new healthcare reform law. Doing nothing does not seem to be a viable option in the current climate; however, depending on the reasons for the Court’s decision, we could end up with a replacement plan that is more of a combination of federal and state initiatives, whichever party prevails at the polls.

 

Day Three—Severability

The marathon third day of oral argument began with a spirited debate of the severability question. This will be an issue, of course, only if the Court strikes down the individual mandate. Severability has both legal and practical implications. One threshold question that many of the Justices seemed to be struggling with was how to draw the line as to what parts of the law should rise or fall with the individual mandate. On the one hand, if the young and healthy do not purchase insurance, premiums would be higher for those who do purchase insurance and if there are more uninsured, hospitals in particular would be under increasing pressure to provide free or discounted care. Certain provisions regulating healthcare coverage, such as guaranteed issue, would prove more costly to implement. On the other hand, many aspects of the healthcare reform law arguably have a lesser degree of connection to the mandate, such as the renewal of expiring programs, modification of fraud and abuse laws, or increased transparency in the community benefit activities of nonprofit hospitals. Could the law have been passed without those provisions or, stated differently, without the individual mandate would the law have been passed at all? What relevance should be placed in the lack of direction by Congress on severability in the law itself? Should the Court assume that Congress would want as much of the legislation as possible to remain in effect and that what’s left can be fixed by Congress, or should it give Congress a clean slate to operate from?

 

Those are just some of the questions teed up on oral argument. If the individual mandate and perhaps some other provisions are severed, then the regulators will face a key decision point over whether to insist on implementation of the remaining programs. Some features of the law though, if left undisturbed, are arguably self-implementing, such as many of the fraud and abuse changes and at least some of the provisions requiring enhanced community benefit processes and disclosures for nonprofit hospitals. For other programs, such as the Medicare Shared Savings Program, the answer may be less clear.

 

If the Court concludes that the mandate is not severable, e.g., because it is too central to the overall purpose of the legislation and inextricably tied to other major components of the law, then the healthcare sector may see at least a few months of inactivity while the political process plays out. There will be pressure, however, for each party to develop a replacement plan as noted above.

 

Day Three—Medicaid

At first blush, one might say that the Medicaid expansion is found money for the states. Few if any states have what could be consider flush Medicaid programs. As evidenced by the community benefit discussions in the tax area in recent years, we have all heard about cost shortfalls in providing care to Medicaid beneficiaries—though some payment is clearly better than none. For some states, however, there has been concern that the expansion is not funded indefinitely by the federal government, and that states will be obligated to continue the expanded benefits beyond the period of full federal funding. Failure to implement the expansion, according to those reluctant states, also could result in loss of all Medicaid funding. Whether or not such a cut off has to be a reasonable action to be upheld was itself an issue debated during oral argument, as was the main question of whether the provisions designed to encourage (or as the challengers would say, force) states to expand Medicaid were impermissibly coercive.

 

One advocate (Mr. Clement), responding to a question from the bench, commented that whether or not to accept a $10 million job offer depends on where the money comes from. That is perhaps an age-old question for federally funded programs in general. Should the Court uphold the provisions for expanding Medicaid, the reluctant states may be faced with a classic Hobson’s Choice—agree to expanded benefits that they may not be able to afford on their own or risk losing substantial federal support for their Medicaid programs. Of course, the Administration argues that this choice of accepting more funds to expand coverage has defined the history of the Medicaid program. The immediate result may be some rather rushed negotiations to try to obtain some assurances as to future funding plans. If the Medicaid expansion is invalidated by the Court, then the “found money” would be lost and the Hobson’s Choice would evaporate. Cost pressures on the state Medicaid programs, however, would continue and providers already struggling to cover cost shortfalls from a substantial Medicaid patient load may face increased financial struggles.

 

The Road Ahead …

The road ahead for the healthcare sector post-decision in the Healthcare Case of the Century may have many twists, but one thing you can count on is for AHLA to be there at every sign post to point you along the way. We will cover the constitutional ins and outs of the actual decision and its implications for the healthcare sector at our Annual Meeting in Chicago, June 25-27. This is one not to miss folks. See you in Chicago!

Merits Of ACA Challenge Debated At National Press Club

The volume of coverage of the Supreme Court's review of the Affordable Care Act may have dropped off precipitously yesterday, but the issue is still buzzing among constitutional scholars, think tanks and in academic institutions. A debate on the constitutionality of the law at the National Press Club last night, sponsored by Syracuse University, pitted representatives from both sides of the issue against one another, as Uwe Reinhardt and Michael Cannon debated whether the ACA is good or bad policy, and two attorneys, Robert Levy and Simon Lazarus, went head to head on the legal issues.

 

There may not have been anything novel in their presentations last night, but the emphasis on particular issues continues to be of interest. Uwe Reinhardt set the context for evaluating whether the policy is good or bad based on theory of justice preferences. This involves answering to what extent are we the “keepers” of others’ [our poor brothers and sisters] health? Contrary to Canadians and Europeans, Congress doesn’t enunciate the theory of justice that supports a particular legislative measure and focuses more on the economic parameters of a proposed law. Mr. Reinhardt believes the ACA is good policy based on a Rawlsian theory of justice, which supports the view that it is the duty of  society to help others “flourish.” He noted that libertarians generally adopt a rights-based theory of justice, which sees “taxing A to help B” as unjust. Regardless of the theory one adopts, Mr. Reinhardt stressed that both theories of justice must be respected, and observed that one of the worst aspects of the controversy about the ACA were the vicious attacks from both sides  against people who hold  different philosophical views on this issue.

 

The legal debate focused almost solely on the constitutionality of the individual mandate. Bob Levy, Chairman of the Cato Institute, tackled the issue raised by Judge Sutton in Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011), in his decision that the individual mandate  does not exceed the federal government’s powers under the Commerce Clause.  Self-insuring and buying health insurance are not forms of the same economic activity, Mr. Levy argued, contrary to Judge Sutton’s ruling. The decision not to buy insurance and  to thereby personally assume the costs of paying for health services if/when they are needed is “inactivity”; it is a thought process that is not subject to government regulation, analogous to an individual’s decision not to work. So although the consumption of health services does constitute an economic activity, the decision about how to pay for those services should one eventually need to purchase them is not economic activity, Mr. Levy argued.

 

Simon Lazarus, from the Center for Law and Social Policy, argued the opposing view, stressing that Judge Sutton’s opinion specifically states that self-insuring and buying health insurance are different ways for people to manage the same risk and they are therefore both forms of the same economic activity.  Mr. Lazarus further contended that because the decision  to not buy insurance has the effect of imposing the cost of covering health services for the uninsured on everyone, that decision is a form of economic activity. 

 What Happens If Health Care Reform Is Unconstitutional or is Repealed     
I went back into my archive and found the following draft article submitted to AHLA; I can't find out whether or not the article ever was revised and published; but I set forth my draft here now (I recall also posting a suggested clause for use in anticipating possible unconstitutionality etc. but I can't find that either because I can't get into the Archive yet). This is a troublesome issue, for sure! And will all the PHI created under the statutes stop being PHI if the statutes are unconstitutional or does HIPAAized IIHI remain PHI even if health care reform falls? What are the professional obligations of attorneys now regarding initiating advice to clients regarding reliance upon the health reform statutes before and funds paid, received, and held, and contracts signed and services provided, as referenced in my draft below? Permission to copy what I say below is granted, so long as qualified by the DRAFT heading and also includes mention of my name but hopefully not in vain and "does not constitute opinions or definitive statements of views regarding any information presented or discussed...." Query whether the foregoing and the following are being discussed at the AHLA Medicare/Medicaid seminar now? IMPORTANT ALERT: Replies to listerv postings will go to the entire listserv and will NOT go just to the posting participant. Regards, Alan S. Goldberg, JD, LLM (Tax), Mod'r, HIT listserv, AHLA Past Pres. & Inaug. Fellow Alan@GoldbergLawyer.com 6845 Elm St., Suite 205, McLean, Virginia 22101 http://www.healthlawyer.com http://twitter.com/GoldbergLawyer http://www.linkedin.com/in/GoldbergLawyer http://www.facebook.com/GoldbergLawyer Adjunct Professor of Health Law, George Mason University & American University Washington College of Law Admitted PA VA NY DC FL MA Admitted US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims Accredited attorney for claimants for veterans benefits before the US Department of Veterans Affairs This email is neither legal nor tax advice and cannot be used by anyone to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; please retain a competent attorney for legal or tax advice. Postings are for educational purposes only, and do not constitute opinions or definitive statements of views regarding any information presented or discussed. Any advertisers sponsoring advertisements appearing with this listserv participant's listserv postings neither are selected nor endorsed by this listserv participant. DRAFT What Happens If Health Care Reform Is Unconstitutional or is Repealed: Health Reform & Contracting: Predicting the Future, Carefully ... © Copyright 2010 Alan S. Goldberg - All Rights Reserved - For Educational Purposes Only November 10, 2010 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Attorneys who are not experienced in and are not able to consider and address health care law issues implicated in transactions and litigation should exercise extreme caution when embarking upon legal representation that involves any health care law issues including in particular, issues implicating health reform. Even those experienced in health care today must increase their knowledge and enhance their expertise, in order to maintain their professional competence and to provide appropriate legal advice and counseling to their clients, and indeed, to address their own health care needs from a health law perspective and the needs of their families and law firm colleagues. In other words, health lawyering is not for novices, now more than ever, and health care reform expertise is even more likely to be necessary now when engaging in counseling, and in negotiations and contract drafting. Among the most difficult challenges is to predict the future. More specifically, will the Affordable Care Act or any part of the new legislation be declared unconstitutional or will all or any part of the new legislation be revoked or changed by Congress? Query what is being done regarding that which cannot be predicted: that is, what ultimately will be the consequences insofar as contracts and payments and professional and other services sought and provided and other actions and inactions, governmental and otherwise, are concerned if, as and when any one or more of several eventualities occur; among them are the entire health reform legislation is determined to be unconstitutional; or some of the legislation is unconstitutional; or Congress repeals all or some of the legislation which itself becomes the subject of litigation; or a constitutionality determination does not clearly address retroactivity or the circumstances that ensued after purported enactment and reliance upon the legislation by many including the federal and state governments: what happens to contracts entered into, and money paid, and commitments made, and all the rest, if, as and when the future unfolds in a manner inconsistent with currently thought lawfully to be in-force health reform and related legislation and rules and guidance relative thereto? Will money have to be returned? If so, to whom and when? Is the failure to return money to be construed as having filed a false claim or illegally retaining monies to which the recipient was not entitled and which the payor should not have paid? What about the catastrophic insurance circumstances of years ago, when Congress did, in fact, repeal the new law -- is there any guidance from what occurred in that situation and any others in which legislation was declared to be unconstitutional and contracts entered into, and money paid, and commitments made, and all the rest, had to be addressed thereafter? Is this "force majeure" and do clauses regarding the same sufficiently address these possibilities? Is mandatory arbitration or mediation service use a necessary path to follow and should reformation/renegotiation clauses be included in contracts? What are the implications of force majeure clauses and clauses purporting to limit damages or to specify liquidated damages? How would federal and state law interrelate when contracts are governed by state law but federal law undermines the assumptions upon which they are based? Is there "health reform unconstitutionality insurance" being sold and bought to provide protection or does any other available insurance product provide any protection for anyone? Does professional liability insurance address issues implicated if allegations of flawed delivery of professional services are made and pursued? What about agreements of indemnification and what do they implicate regarding damages relating to health reform constitutionality concerns? What about subrogation or waiver of subrogation provisions of insurance policies and of health contracts generally? If someone receives the benefits of insurance, now mandated by health reform legislation, and those benefits are paid for or services are paid for, but eventually payment of those benefits or for those services was not consistent with federal constitutional law or a portion of the law that is repealed (retroactively to enactment? or not?), who repays what to whom, and when, and how, particularly when government payments are involved? Would repayments or other payments made be inconsistent with other federal and state laws relating to anti-kickback and Stark (and state analogues) and would there be false claims allegations retrospectively arising, at least in theory? What about tax return filings and under payments or overpayments that could arise including expiration of periods for amendment or claims for refunds? What counseling obligations are imposed in connection with giving legal advice to those involved in health care regarding the foregoing issues and concerns and what consents or documentation of advice given and understood are appropriate? The accompanying materials provided by the American Health Lawyers Association [re: ADR] inform regarding some ways of endeavoring to address the foregoing, and likely there are others to which thought should be given. Competence in health lawyering today would seem now to include being able to predict the future! --------------------------30-----------------------
THE ORAL ARGUMENTS: March 28, 2012

Severability and Medicaid Expansion

 

Impressions from Inside the Court Room

Day 3 of the Hearings

Mark A. Hall

Wake Forest University

The Court continued to display deep divisions on the core issues in Wednesday's two arguments—the first on whether to sever the individual mandate from the rest of the ACA if it is declared unconstitutional, and the second on whether Medicaid's expansion coerces the states.

On severability, several Justices appeared open to the challengers' position that striking the mandate would gut the heart of the ACA and leave behind only an outer shell of miscellaneous other provisions that Congress would not have intended to stand by themselves. Justice Scalia in particular said that preserving some or all of the rest of the Act would be "a gross distortion" of the democratic process rather than "somehow showing deference to Congress."

Bartow Farr, the Court-appointed amicus, argued for the narrowest version of severability, which would leave the rest of the Act intact if the Court strikes the mandate. Although conceding that the mandate is central to the regulatory scheme, he argued that Congress should be left to decide whether to make further amendments or instead to just leave the rest of the law as is and see how that works. Justice Kennedy, however, seemed troubled by the prospect of the Court issuing an order that could cost the insurance industry billions of dollars. He repeatedly characterized the individual mandate as a financing mechanism whose principal purpose is to raise the funds necessary to pay for expanded coverage. That contrasts distinctly with the view that the mandate's main purpose is correcting adverse selection, but under that view also, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor seemed reluctant to issue a ruling that might well cause significant adverse selection in the market.

The government attempted to walk a middle ground—calling for striking the law's guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions if the mandate falls. Several Justices appeared to agree that those provisions are closely linked to the mandate, but they were troubled by having to decide which other provisions were and were not also sufficiently linked to the mandate to warrant not severing them as well. As they asked Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler several times, what specifically justifies drawing the line at these market regulations and not at the subsidies for purchase, or the exchanges, or all of Title I, or also parts of Title II, etc.?

It is impossible for this observer to discern at the end of this well-argued session where exactly the Court might end up on the difficult severability question.

Positions on Medicaid expansion aligned more clearly with the Justices' known social and political views. The four Justices with more liberal leanings appeared to clearly reject the argument that it might ever constitute coercion simply to offer states a deal too good to refuse. Several Justices from the conservative wing, however, insisted that some test or standard for this type of "coercion" is needed to keep Congress' spending power from being too expansive.

Part of the discussion was almost philosophical: does coercion depend mainly on how much the federal government threatens to take away (the stick), or mainly on what is being offered (the carrot)—or on the relation of one to the other? Other parts of the discussion were quite practical: although the Secretary of HHS might have the authority to stop all Medicaid funding for failing to comply with new conditions, would she in fact, considering that she (and predecessors) never have. Returning to theory, however, Justices Roberts and Scalia asked whether it even matters that the mugger has never pulled the trigger. Isn't it enough that he might?

Pursuing that analogy, Justice Scalia at one point elaborated that "when you say you're coerced, it means you've been . . . given an offer you can't refuse. You can't refuse your money or your life. But your life or your wife's, I could refuse that one." When that brought laughs, he clarified by saying "I'm talking about my life . . . —take mine, you know," which brought more chuckles and side comments from the bench.

Perhaps critical, however, was Justice Ginsburg's clarification at the very end, that, were the Court to take this step, the challengers would be satisfied with simply giving each state the right to opt out of the Medicaid expansion, rather than striking the expansion in its entirety.

Audio of Day Three Oral Arguments (Medicaid Expansion) Now Available
The Supreme Court has posted the audio recording of the March 28 oral arguments on the Medicaid expansion, as well as the unofficial transcript:
 
Audio of Day Three Oral Arguments (Severability) Now Available

The Supreme Court has posted the audio recording of the March 28 oral arguments on severability on its website, as well as the unofficial transcript:

Severability and Coercion
Day 3 of the arguments.  The pundits saw palpable skepticism for the constitutionality of the individual mandate yesterday.  Today, the advocates and the Justices will be discussing severability and whether the law's Medicaid provisions are unconstitutionally coercive of the States.
 
On severability, the issue that I would look for in the Justice's questions is what is the proper legal standard to apply?  Is it whether the provisions at issue would have passed Congress in the absence of the unconstitutional provision?  If so, the States and the NFIB's arguments will carry greater weight.  Or is it whether the provisions remaining after the unconstitutional provision is excised out can operate or function as intended by Congress?  If so, the administration's argument looks stronger.  I would look for the standard embraced by Justices as they ask their questions.
 
On the issue of an unconstitutional coercion of the States, I would pay close attention to whether the Justices accept the States' notion that the individual mandate requirement and the penalty for failure to obtain such insurance are separable and independent obligations.  Even though the separability arguments relates to the individual mandate, it plays heavily into the Medicaid coercion argument. The States essentially argue that all Medicaid recipients will have a legal obligation to be insured, but if a state opts out of the Medicaid program, they will have no means of becoming insured.  Because the federal government did not create a plan B if a state opted out of Medicaid, the federal government did not truly intend for the Medicaid mandate to be optional.  Several Justices expressed skepticism about whether the requirement to obtain minimum essential coverage and the penalty for failing to obtain it were separable on Monday so look for a recurrence of that debate today.  It will also be interesting to see if the Justices accept the argument that the sheer scope of the program and the dollars already received by States can make an additional requirement in such a program a form of coercion. 
 
Enjoy Day 3 and please add to the AHLA blog.  We hope that this is an excellent resource for our members.
 
Peter Leibold
The Moral Case for the ACA

As lawyers, we are taught to be dispassionate in our analysis of legal problems.  On the legal validity of the Affordable Care Act, I cannot.

 

After spending numerous hours trying to analyze the issues and making angels dance on the head of a pin, although we are lawyers, more importantly we are human beings.  And as human beings, there are several truths that come out in the end.

 

First, for a variety of reasons, our system is widely considered to be the most expensive in the world.  According to figures in T.R. Reid’s “The Healing of America,” the World Health Organization ranks us 25th in the world in health adjusted life expectancy and something like 37th in the world in outcomes and equity.  According to Reid, the Institute of Medicine has determined that 22,000 people lose their lives every year because they lack health insurance, and many more suffer economic hardship due to illness that otherwise could have been avoided or ameliorated.  The Catholic Health Association views the ACA as a “pro life” law.

 

We also know that it is virtually impossible to address the cost and accessibility of insurance on the individual market in a market based system such as our current one, without an individual mandate.  Pretending that you can eliminate adverse selection based upon pre-existing conditions and obtain community rating without most, if not everyone, being in the pool of lives is simply unrealistic. 

 

Thus, irrespective of whether each and every provision of the ACA is perfect, the issue comes down to one simple question:  “Does the United States Congress have the authority to tax or penalize an individual who chooses not to purchase health care insurance approximately $700 per year in order to try to improve the most expensive system in the world, that produces only the 25th best result in health adjusted life expectancy, the 37th best result in quality and equity, to provide health insurance to 30,000,000 people who are otherwise uninsured or self- insured, and to save approximately 22,000 lives per year. 

 

I would also note that these numbers are associated with real people.  Many of us know personally people with serious conditions who will be uninsurable on the individual market, or insurable only at astronomical cost, without the protections of the ACA.  In fact, in one webinar that CMMI convened several months ago on one aspect of delivery system reform, during the q and a session, a woman spoke up describing her situation of being uninsured through no fault of her own, having stage 4 cancer, and pleading for help.  This is real life.

 

I would hope that these factors would drive the Supreme Court to the conclusion that Congress has the right to address this incredibly serious and complex problem in a fundamental way, and to make corrections along the way where it deems necessary. 

 

Posted by Michael Cook

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